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PREVIEW—Atlantic Richfield Company v. Christian: The 
Intersection of Superfund and State-Law Restoration Claims  
 
Emily McCulloch*  
 
The Supreme Court of the United States will hear oral arguments 
in this matter on Tuesday, December 3, 2019, at 11:00 a.m. in the Supreme 
Court Building in Washington, D.C. Lisa S. Blatt will likely appear for the 
Petitioner. Joseph R. Palmore will likely appear for the Respondents. 
Solicitor General Noel J. Francisco will likely argue for the United States. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Atlantic Richfield Company (“ARCO”) began cleanup efforts 
at the Anaconda Superfund Site in 1983—stemming from the 1980 
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability 
Act’s (“CERCLA”)1 enactment—to address arsenic and lead 
contamination from over a century of copper mining and refining around 
Butte, Montana.2 ARCO argues that the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s (“EPA”) remediation plan for the site is the sole remedy under 
CERCLA and therefore bars state-law claims.3 The respondents, seventy-
seven area landowners (“Landowners”), contend they have a right to bring 
common-law claims requiring ARCO to further remediate their land, 
which the Anaconda Smelter polluted for over a century.4  
The Supreme Court of the United States must review: (1) whether 
a state-law claim for additional clean-up “challenges” the EPA’s sole 
restoration remedy; (2) whether a landowner, who has never been ordered 
to remediate their land, is considered a potentially responsible party 
(“PRP”) in the EPA’s action plan; and (3) whether CERCLA preempts 
conflicting state-law claims that require additional restoration.5 The 
Court’s decision will impact future CERCLA claims because it could 
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1. 42 U.S.C §§ 9601–9628 (2018).  
2. Resp’ts’ Br. at 7–10, Oct. 15, 2019, No. 17-1498. 
3. Pet’r’s Br. at 9, Aug. 21, 2019, No. 17-1498.   
4. Resp’ts’Br. at 7–10.  
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II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In 1977, ARCO acquired the Anaconda Company in what some 
described as “one of the decade’s worst mergers.”6 Three years later, the 
company’s smelter in Anaconda, Montana, closed; ARCO became 
responsible for remediation pursuant to CERCLA’s standards.7 Over the 
next thirty-six years, ARCO spent around $450 million in CERCLA-
mandated cleanup.8  
Local residents have asserted that the remediation efforts are 
insufficient9 and that the area surrounding the smelter’s smokestack is 
uninhabitable due to lead and arsenic contamination.10 ARCO, however, 
says it has followed all CERCLA requirements despite the “Herculean 
challenge[s]” posed by the “New York City-sized” site.11 ARCO 
maintains that it has succeeded with remediation efforts and restored 
wetlands and lush vegetation.12 
In 2008, Landowners sued ARCO in Montana district court for 
negligence, nuisance, trespass, unjust enrichment, and constructive fraud, 
seeking restoration damages.13 In December 2013, the district court 
granted summary judgment for ARCO, holding that Montana’s statute of 
limitations barred Landowners from recovery.14  
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of 
the unjust enrichment and constructive fraud claims but reversed and 
remanded the remaining claims, concluding the district court improperly 
applied the statute of limitations.15  
On remand, the district court awarded Landowners a restoration 
remedy, which entitled Landowners to seek the measure of damages they 
would be entitled to if ARCO trespassed and created a nuisance on 
Landowners’ property.16  
ARCO then requested a writ of supervisory control.17 The 
Montana Supreme Court agreed with Landowners, however, stating that 
their claim was not a “challenge” to the EPA, they were not PRPs, and 
CERCLA did not preempt those claims.18  
 
6. Pet’r’s Br. at 9.   
7. Id.   
8. Id. at 11.  
9. Resp’ts’ Br. at 7–8.  
10. Id. at 9.  
11. Pet’r’s Br. at 11.  
12. Id. at 15.  
13. Christian v. Atl. Richfield Co., 358 P.3d 131, 139 (Mont. 2015).  
14. Id. at 139. 
15. Id.  
16. Resp’ts’ Br. at 51 (referencing Sunburst School Dist. No. 2 v. 
Texaco, Inc., 165 P.3d 1079, 1087 (Mont. 2007). 
17. Atl. Richfield Co. v. Mont. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 408 P.3d 
515 (Mont. 2017); see also Pet’r’s Br. at 19. 
18. Atl. Richfield Co., 408 P.3d at 522–23; see also Pet’r’s Br. at 20. 
2019  PREVIEW: ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO. V. CHRISTIAN  3 
On April 27, 2018, ARCO petitioned for certiorari, which the 
Supreme Court granted on June 10, 2019.19 Of the original five claims, the 
sole issue before the Court is the restoration damages claim.20 
 
III.  SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 
A.  Petitioner’s Arguments 
 
1.  Jurisdiction 
 
 ARCO argues that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction because a 
judgment that terminates original proceedings when the issue concerns 
state court jurisdiction is reviewable, even if other issues remain pending 
in lower courts.21 Additionally, ARCO notes the Court has jurisdiction 
because, as an exception to the finality rule, restoration damages are a 
distinct claim, and reversal “would dispose of the judgment before.”22 
 
2.  State-Law Claims & CERCLA  
 
ARCO asserts that Montana courts lacked jurisdiction over 
Landowners’ restoration claim because the term “federal” in the statute 
bars state-law claims.23 ARCO claims Congress intended for federal 
jurisdiction to cover all CERCLA claims because the statute’s expansive 
language includes “all controversies” that are a “challenge” to CERCLA.24 
Because Landowners “challenge” CERCLA through their own proposed 
soil action and water contamination plans, “only federal courts . . . have 
jurisdiction” to adjudicate the “challenge.”25 ARCO emphasizes that 
CERCLA’s purpose is to allow challenges in very limited circumstances 
in federal courts, and changing this interpretation would “blow a Montana-




19. Atl. Richfield Co. v. Christian, 139 S. Ct. 2690 (2019); see also 
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian, SCOTUSBLOG (last visited Nov. 11, 2019), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/atlantic-richfield-co-v-christian/.  
20. Resp’ts’ Br. at 10. 
21. Pet’r’s Rep. Br. at 2, Nov. 14, 2019, No. 17-1498 (citing Fisher v. 
Dist. Court of Sixteenth Judicial Dist., 424 U.S. 382, 385 (1976)).   
22. Id. at 3 (citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 482–83 
(1975)). 
23. Pet’r’s Br. at 30 (relying on 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b), which states that 
matters apart from those addressed in subsection (a) and (h) are under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of United States District Courts and states Section (h) is irrelevant because 
the narrow exceptions listed do not apply). 
24. Id. at 27 (quoting Fort Ord Toxics Project, Inc. v. Cal. EPA, 189 
F.3d 828, 832 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
25. Id. (quoting Fort Ord Toxics Project, Inc. v. California EPA, 189 
F.3d 828, 832 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
26. Id. at 31. 
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3.  Potentially Responsible Parties  
 
ARCO maintains that Landowners are PRPs, and, accordingly, 
CERCLA bars their claims because ‘“no potentially responsible party may 
undertake any remedial action at the facility’ without the EPA’s 
authorization.”27 A PRP can be any “owner and operator of a vessel or a 
facility,” and therefore, as ARCO argues, Landowners are subject to the 
EPA’s remediation plan.28 ARCO asserts that allowing Landowners to fall 
outside the scope of PRPs would greatly undermine the CERCLA’s 
purpose because “landowners are the PRPs most likely to go off and 
pursue their own visions of remediation.”29 Also, ARCO notes that “for 
nearly 30 years, the EPA [in its own memorandum] has interpreted the 
term ‘potentially responsible parties’ to encompass residential 
landowners.”30 
Additionally, ARCO challenges the Montana Supreme Court’s 
holding that a PRP designation can only occur through a voluntary 
settlement with the EPA, a judicial designation, or defendant status in a 
CERCLA lawsuit.31 ARCO argues that parties are PRPs before any 
litigation begins.32 ARCO states the critical statutory word in PRP is 
“potential” because a party has the potential of being a PRP even if they 
are factually non-liable.33 Finally, ARCO points out the EPA’s 
remediation plan benefits all parties because it takes into account all PRPs, 
including Landowners.34 
ARCO also questions the Montana Supreme Court’s ruling that 
CERCLA limits PRP designation to six years.35 ARCO maintains that 
because Landowners did not fall within the three designations, the statute 
of limitations prevents their designation as PRPs.36 ARCO argues the 
intent behind designating PRPs was to avoid “reach[ing] the six-year mark 
without facing a qualifying suit or settlement and launch[ing] their own 
 
27. Id. at 32 (referencing Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United 
States, 556 U.S. 599 (2009) (holding that landowners were PRPs because they owned 
and used the contaminated land)).  
28. Id. at 33. 
29.  Id.  
30. Id. at 35 (referencing Memorandum from Don R. Clay, Assistant 
Adm’r, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response & Raymond B. 
Ludwiszewski, Acting Assistant Adm’r, Office of Enforcement, to EPA Reg’l 
Adm’rs, Policy Towards Owners of Residential Property at Superfund Sites, 1, 3–4 
(July 3, 1991) (available at https://bit.ly/2TEmQ1E).  
31. Id.   
32. Id. at 36. 
33. Id.     
34. Id. at 37.  
35. Atl. Richfield Co. v. Mont. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 408 P.3d 
515, 522 (Mont. 2017). 
36. Pet’r’s Br. at 38 (rejecting the court’s reasoning, which was based 
on 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)(B), stating the party must commence the initial recovery 
action for remedial costs within 6 years.)  
37. Id.  
2019  PREVIEW: ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO. V. CHRISTIAN  5 
personal cleanup plan.”37 ARCO emphasizes the purpose of CERCLA is 
to allow the EPA to remediate a situation as soon as possible without 
interference from proposed limitations.38 Moreover, ARCO notes 
Landowners have no exemptions from designation, and if the Court found 
an exemption, it would permit “anyone who could invoke these defenses 
to do whatever they want with Superfund sites.”39 If Landowners did have 
a defense, ARCO contends they are only covered if they abide by the 
EPA’s plan.40 Finally, ARCO denies Landowners’ contention that they are 
a “contiguous party” because no court has granted them such status.41 
 
4.  Preemption 
 
ARCO argues state and federal law conflict, and thus it cannot 
comply with both the EPA plan and Landowners’ claims.42 Additionally, 
ARCO maintains that once the EPA performed a remedial investigation, 
ARCO then lacked the authority to move ahead with any other remedial 
plans without the EPA’s permission.43 Because the EPA’s regulations set 
both a ceiling and a floor, ARCO argues that states cannot require more 
remediation.44  
Moreover, ARCO asserts that a restoration remedy conflicts with 
CERCLA’s objectives.45 If state law conflicts with a federal law’s 
objectives, then it is considered an “obstacle to Congress.”46 ARCO argues 
the “obstacle” here is Montana’s law which does not allow CERCLA “to 
choose and implement the most effective means of cleaning up hazardous 
waste sites.”47 Additionally, ARCO states that if Landowners succeed with 
their remediation claim, it would dissuade voluntary cooperation from 
PRPs because of additional litigation threats.48  
Finally, ARCO declares that CERCLA’s savings clauses do not 
apply to Landowners’ remediation claims.49 Although CERCLA does not 
preempt all state environmental claims, ARCO nevertheless argues that it 
does not encompass state laws that “seek to dictate substantive clean-up” 




38. Id. at 40. 
39. Id.  
40 Pet’r’s Rep. Br. at 10.  
41. Id. at 15.   
42. Pet’r’s Br. at 40.  
43. Id. at 44.  
44. Id. at 50. 
45. Id. at 47. 
46. Id. (citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) 
(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
47. Id. at 48 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9621(a)–(d)).  
48. Id. at 50. 
49. Id. at 52. 
50. Id. at 54. 
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claims and do not permit “challenges” brought against ARCO’s cleanup 
obligations.51 
 




Landowners assert the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction52 because 
the lower courts have not issued a final holding on the remediation 
damages claim, and thus it is not “an effective determination of the 
litigation . . . [but rather is] merely interlocutory or intermediate . . . .”53  
 
2. State-Law Claims & CERCLA  
 
Landowners assert ARCO failed to take into account the second 
provision under the “express terms” of 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h), which only 
applies to claims brought under federal jurisdiction, not state-law 
jurisdiction.54 Landowners argue Congress intended to use precise 
language by creating the exceptions under Section (a) and Section (h).55 
Additionally, Congress intended to limit Section (b) by using “arising 
under[,]” so Landowners argue ARCO misinterpreted Congress’s intent.56 
Ultimately, Landowners argue that Section (b) does not apply because 
CERCLA does not apply.57  
 Landowners also note the legislative history “confirms what the 
statutory text dictates: Section 113 does not bar state-law actions in state 
court.”58 The original Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act59 
(“SARA”) included a similar section to CERCLA’s Section (h) but left out 
“federal” and merely stated “No court shall have jurisdiction . . . .”60 Then 
Congress revised the SARA to include “federal[,]” which Landowners 
argue shows Congress did not intend for CERCLA to preempt all state-
law claims.61  
 Further, Landowners argue even if Section (h) applied to state-law 
claims, ARCO’s argument still fails because Landowners are not 
 
51. Id. at 55.  
52. Resp’ts’ Br. at 18. 
53. Id. (quoting Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, 522 U.S. 75, 81 (1997)). 
54. Id. at 22.  
55. Id. at 23–24. 
56. Id. at 24–25.  
57. Id. at 21–23.  
58. Id. at 29.  
59. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. 
No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, 1650.  
60. Id.; Resp’ts’ Br. (citing H.R. Res. 2005, 99th Cong. § 113(h) 
(1985)).  
61. Resp’ts’ Br. at 30–31 (citing 132 Cong. Rec. 33,554-55 (Oct. 17, 
1986 (stating that the provision was revised to preserve actions “based on State 
nuisance law, or actions to abate the hazardous substance release itself, independent 
of Federal response action”). 
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challenging the EPA’s remedial orders.62 To qualify as a challenge, 
Landowners contend a plaintiff must contest the “legality of an EPA 
ordered remedy” leading to judicial review.63  Based upon the Section (h)’s 
five timing exceptions, Landowners argue Congress was specifically 
concerned with timing of review based on their “selective remedy for a 
qualified time.”64 Therefore, given the timing of the suit, Landowners 
maintain this is not a challenge with respect to an EPA remedial order.65  
Finally, Landowners dispute ARCO’s argument that CERCLA 
governs any legal claim that involves a cleanup outside EPA’s remedy.66 
Landowners note that “had Congress intended Section 113(h) to preclude 
any additional, non-CERCLA remediation, it would have said so expressly 
. . . .”67  
  
3. Potentially Responsible Parties 
 
 Landowners agree a PRP is a “party who faces some possibility 
of CERCLA liability” but argue there is no such possibility here because 
Landowners did not contaminate their property.68 Landowners argue an 
owner is defined as a “covered person[,]” not a PRP as ARCO insists.69 
According to the Landowners, the Supreme Court has held that PRPs are 
covered persons under CERCLA, but it has never considered whether all 
covered persons are PRPs.70 Because the Court has never specifically 
decided this issue, Landowners argue they are not automatically PRPs.71 
Further, as Landowners assert, if property owners are PRPs, then the EPA 
would possess absolute authority to control any remedial action, thus 
constituting a taking under the Fifth Amendment.72 Landowners state that 
forcing innocent parties to “forever house pollutants” on their land 
amounts to a ‘“current physical occupation of land”’ and therefore a 
taking.73 Additionally, Landowners explain that legislative history shows 
Congress did not intend for a PRP to include any party other than those 
who could be liable.74 Moreover, statutes of limitations do apply here to 
 
62. Id. at 31. 
63. Id. at 32 (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 9604).  
64. Id.  
65. Id.  
66. Id. at 34. 
67. Id.   
68. Id. at 36. 
69. Id. at 38.  
70. Id. at 38–39. 
71. Id. at 39.  
72. Id. at 42.  
73. Id. (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 
U.S. 419, 421 (1982)).   
74. Id. at 43 (emphasis added) (explaining that usage was reflected in 
the version of SARA that passed the House, which expressly defined “potentially 
responsible party” to mean “a person against whom an action could be brought under 
section 106 with respect to [a] release or a person who would be liable under section 
107 if response costs were incurred.” H.R. Res. 2005, 99th Cong. § 122(k) (1985)).  
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encourage timely prosecution, which does not negate the EPA’s power to 
prosecute PRPs as ARCO contends.75 
 Furthermore, Landowners—assuming arguendo that the statutory 
language considers them PRPs—assert they are nonetheless considered an 
exempt “contiguous party” under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(q).76 Pursuant to that 
section, real property owners who own land next to a hazardous site “shall 
not be considered to be an owner or operator” of a “facility.”77 Landowners 
note that even if they are PRPs, the Court will still have to remand in order 




 Landowners argue that because they are bringing state nuisance 
and trespass claims, there is no conflict between federal and state law.79 
Landowners state “no federal law required ARCO to deposit arsenic, lead, 
and other toxic metals on Landowners’ yards or prohibits ARCO from 
paying money to Landowners to use in cleaning their land.”80 Further, 
Landowners note “unless EPA would never permit ARCO to further 
remediate, it would not be impossible for ARCO to compl[y] with both 
federal and state regulations.”81 Also, Landowners contend ARCO did not 
make an effort to seek the EPA’s permission to remove any additional 
contamination from the land.82 For example, ARCO argues the proposed 
underground trenches for water contamination and additional soil removal 
are inconsistent with the EPA’s remediation plan, precluding the 
additional requirements.83 Landowners contend the additional remediation 
does not conflict with EPA’s plan because there is no indication that the 
EPA would not allow additional remedies.84 
 In response to ARCO’s concern that a state-law suit will interfere 
with CERCLA’s goals, Landowners contend that Congress would have 
specifically laid that out as its intent in creating CERCLA, arguing that 
 
75. Id. at 46–47. 
76. Id. at 47.  
77. Id. at 48 (explaining that under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(q)(1)(A)(i)–(vii), 
Landowners did not “cause, contribute, or consent to the release” of that substance; 
they are not potentially liable through any relationship with the entity that did pollute 
their land, i.e., ARCO; they have not allowed any further releases from their property; 
and they have complied with any land-use and notice obligations that might be 
imposed). 
78. Id. at 49–50. 
79. Id. at 50. 
80. Id. at 53–54.  
81. Id. at 55 (quoting Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 
S. Ct. 1668, 1675 (2019)). 
82. Id. at 56.  
83. Id. at 58.  
84. Id. at 59.  
85. Id. at 59–60 (referencing Manor Care, Inc. v. Yaskin, 950 F.2d 122, 
126 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
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Congress intended CERCLA to set a floor—not a ceiling—relating to 
hazardous wastes, so states can enact supplemental laws.85 Landowners 
point to language in 42 U.S.C. § 9614(b) that reduces the amount a person 
can recover under state law for removal costs, which indicates there is 
recourse on a state level.86  Landowners cite to Justice Alito’s opinion 
which stated, “if CERCLA’s remedies preempted state remedies for 
recovering costs of hazardous waste cleanups, § 114(b) would make no 
sense at all . . . .”87  Additionally, a state law claim for remedial efforts 
provides only additional, not conflicting liability.88 Finally, in addressing 
ARCO’s point that allowing state-law claims will negate negotiation 
settlements and create environmental risks, Landowners again declare that 
Congress neither intended state law claims to preclude settlements nor 
intended to prohibit state law claims from requiring additional cleanup.89 
 




The Court will need to address Landowners’ argument that the 
Court lacks jurisdiction over their state-law claim because the case has not 
fully been decided. The Court has twice exercised jurisdiction over 
Montana Supreme Court’s original petition decisions in Fisher v. District 
Court and Kennerly v. District Court.90 The Court will likely look to Cox 
Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn to determine if one of the following 
exceptions—specifically the fourth exception—to the finality rule may 
apply: (1) when a federal issue is conclusive or there is a likely outcome 
of the proceedings; (2) when a federal issue decided by a state supreme 
court may “survive” regardless of future proceedings; (3) when a federal 
claim has been decided but there are other issues on the merits still being 
tried in state courts; or (4) when a federal issue is final but the party 
seeking review may prevail on nonfederal grounds.91  
Additionally, ARCO argues this matter may fall under a fifth 
exception: original proceedings.92 The Court has stated “new situations 




86. Id. at 61.  
87. Id. at 62 (quoting Manor Care, Inc. v. Yaskin, 950 F.2d 122, 127 
(3d Cir. 1991).  
88. Id. at 63.  
89. Id. at 65–66.  
90. United States Amicus Br. at 16, Aug. 28, 2019, No. 17-1498.   
91. 420 U.S. 469, 479–83 (1975).  
92. Pet’r’s Br. at 19.  
93. Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 133 (1945) 
(stating “[the Court] will give full play both to the powers that belong to the States 
and to those that are entrusted to the Federal Communications Commission, where the 
two are intertwined as they are here, to enforce the accommodation we have 
formulated”).  
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this an original proceeding and therefore consider the issue ripe.94 
Although none of the current Justices presided over these past cases, 
precedent indicates the Court likely will find it has jurisdiction.  
 
B. Can Landowners Bring State-Law Claims Notwithstanding CERCLA? 
 
The Court must address two issues under this claim: (1) if the 
Montana Supreme Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim; and (2) 
if Landowners’ claim “challenges” the EPA’s remedy under CERCLA. 
ARCO cites Clinton County Commissioners v. EPA, in which the Court 
held that 42 U.S.C § 9613(h)(4) “do[es] not permit district courts to 
exercise jurisdiction over citizens suits challenging incomplete EPA 
remedial actions even where impending irreparable harm is alleged.”95 In 
essence, the Third Circuit states the pre-remediation review through public 
comment serves as judicial review.96 There are narrow exceptions under 
42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) where review by federal courts is appropriate.97 For 
example, the Ninth Circuit held in Fort Ord Toxics Project, Inc. v. Cal. 
EPA that only federal courts have jurisdiction over CERCLA claims.98 
Landowners do not disagree that federal courts have jurisdiction under 
CERCLA, but they argue that their claim is one that arises under state 
law.99 In Sunburst School District No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc., the Montana 
Supreme Court held that the Comprehensive Environmental Cleanup and 
Responsibility Act, a state environmental law like CERCLA, does not 
preempt state-law claims.100 Additionally, if this were a state-law claim, 
the complaint does not arise under federal law because ARCO’s issues are 
based on defenses to CERCLA, which cannot invoke federal law under 
the well-pleaded complaint rule.101 
If the Court does, however, decide that this matter is under federal 
jurisdiction or that state-law claims are precluded, the Court must decide 
if this was a “challenge” to the EPA’s remediation plan. In order to address 
whether state-law claims are considered a challenge and are therefore 
barred through CERCLA, the Court will likely look at legislative intent.  
In order to determine the scope of the statutory provision stating “all 
controversies arising under this chapter,” the Court must decide whether 
Congress intended to use “language more expansive than necessary” to 
encompass all claims brought under CERCLA.102 In contrast, the Court 
 
94.  See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 482 (1975). 
95. 116 F.3d 1018, 1023 (3d Cir. 1997).  
96. Id. at 1025. 
97. Pet’r’s. Br. at 26. 
 98. 189 F.3d 828, 832 (9th Cir. 1999). 
99. Resp’ts’ Br. at 27–28.  
 100. 165 P.3d 1079, 1091 (Mont. 2007). 
101. Resp’ts’ Br. at 24 (referencing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 
U.S. 58, 63 (1987)). 
102. Pet’r’s Br. at 27 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b)).  
103. Resp’ts’ Br. at 34.  
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may also consider Landowners’ contention that if Congress intended to 
encompass all claims, it would have expressly said so in the statute.103 
In weighing whether this is a state-law or federal claim, the Court 
will likely address states’ rights in making their own legislation. While 
many lower courts have barred state-law claims, the Court’s current 
members appear friendly to state rights. Justice Alito, for example, has 
previously stated in a case looking at preemption issues that: “[I]t is as if 
federal officers were installed in state legislative chambers and were 
armed with the authority to stop legislators from voting on any offending 
proposals. A more direct affront to state sovereignty is not easy to 
imagine.”104 With this sentiment in mind, the Court may lean toward state 
court jurisdiction. 
 
3.  Are Landowners Considered Potentially Responsible Parties? 
 
Additionally, the Court will likely address whether Landowners 
are PRPs within the statutory definition. Again, the Court’s answer will 
likely hinge on its evaluation of Congressional intent. ARCO argues the 
clear intent of CERCLA was to include landowners as PRPs to preempt 
any restoration claims.105 Moreover, United States v. Best Foods held that 
parties who are potentially responsible are liable under CERCLA.106 
Landowners maintain, however, that the Court has never addressed 
whether a party can be a PRP if they did not cause the contamination.107  
The Court will likely resist ARCO’s argument that a PRP can be 
an innocent landowner because “questions that merely lurk in the record” 
require further analysis by the Court.108 Additionally, Landowners cite to 
legislative history that may persuade this Court, such as the fact that the 
original CERCLA language never included PRP.109 SARA added PRP to 
“refer to the parties with which it negotiated and that would be responsible 
for cleanup[.]”110 Given the legislative history, as well as the Court’s 
concerns regarding ambiguity, the Court will not likely consider a non-
polluting land owner to automatically qualify as a PRP.  
 
4.  Does CERCLA Preempt a Restoration Remedy? 
 
Finally, the Court will consider ARCO’s impossibility preemption 
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impossibility preemption claim, ARCO relies on the Court’s holding that 
when federal law forbids an action—but state law requires it—then federal 
law preempts the state law.111 In a series of decisions, the Court held that 
certain state laws make it impossible for a party to also follow federal 
law.112 The Court will likely need to analyze whether the state law claims 
for remediation will interfere with the federal law to the extent that federal 
law can preempt the state claim.113 Based on the holdings of three FDA 
cases where the Court found impossibility preemption, it is likely 
Landowners will lose on this issue. However, in Mutual Pharmaceutical 
Company, Inc. v. Bartlett, Justices Breyer, Kagan, Ginsberg, and 
Sotomayor all dissented, specifically noting “Congress' preservation of a 
role for state law generally, and common-law remedies specifically, 
reflects a realistic understanding of the limitations of ex ante federal 
regulatory review . . . .”114 Considering these differing opinions, the 
holding on impossibility preemption will likely depend on Justice 
Kavanaugh’s stance.  
Landowners also argue CERCLA’s savings clauses prevent 
federal preemption.115 Section 9614(a) of CERCLA states, “Nothing in 
this [Act] shall be construed or interpreted as preempting any State from 
imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect to the 
release of hazardous substances within such State.”116 In Williamson v.  
Mazda Motor of American, Inc., Justice Thomas wrote in concurrence that 
the plain text of a savings clause speaks for itself.117 Additionally, Justices 
Roberts, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Alito all agreed that if there is express 
preemption language, then the regulation does not preempt the state law.118 
It remains uncertain, however, whether Court will agree with Landowners 
that there is express language in CERCLA’s savings’ clauses.  The Court 
may, alternatively, agree with ARCO and the read savings clauses 
narrowly in deciding the issue.119 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Landowners’ ability to bring a state-law claim, in addition to the 
EPA’s prescribed remedy, will likely come down to a states’ rights battle. 
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Ultimately, this Court’s precedent shows its deference to states’ rights 
arguments.  However, ARCO’s position that allowing state-law claims 
will open the flood gates and become highly burdensome on companies 
may persuade this Court. If the Court decides that CERCLA bars 
Landowners’ claim, the Court’s holding will nonetheless provide guidance 
as to what constitutes a challenge to CERCLA and whether non-polluting 
landowners are PRPs.  
